AbsrracCIn this paper we report on the analysis of critical incidents during an urban search and rescue robot competition where critical incidents are defined as a situation where the robot could potentially cause damage to itself, the victim, or the environment We look at the features present in the bumanrobot interface that contributed to success in different taska needed in urban search and rescue and present guidelines for human-robot interaction design.
INTRODUCnON
The use of robots in urban search and rescue (USAR) is a challenging area for researchers in the robotics and humanrobot interaction gnu) domains. USAR robots need mobility and robustness. The environments in which they will be used are harsh with many unknowns. These robots must be able to serve as memben of the USAR teams, sending back information to rescue workers about victims, the extent of damages, and structural integrity [l]. Operators of USAR robots will be working long shifts in stressful conditions. Fortunately, most USAR teams are infrequently called to service. However, this means that human-robot interaction must support inikquent nse. The user interactions in USAR robots need to be designed with these requirements in mind Robotics research is making progress in producing autonomous robots. A key to autonomy is perception capabilities. Robots must be able to recognize objects and to make decisions based on what an object is. For example, an off-road driving vehicle can recognize trees and plan a route to navigate around those trees. Current autonomous off-mad driving performance is quite reasonable [2]. The objects that must be perceived are static and relatively few in nature. This is not true in the USAR domain. M e r fires or explosions, objects are difficult even for humans to recognize. Planning paths for navigation is not just locating trees or rocks but picking a path tbmngh or over a rubble-strewn area.
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This work is funded in pati by tbe DARPA MARS pmgram, MST Completely autonomous robots for USAR are definitely not feasible in the near future. Operators must work as teammates with the USAR robots, with all parties contributing according to their skills and capabilities.
It is difficult to study actual USAR events. Casper and Murphy [3] documented efforts to use mbots during 9/11 rescue efforts. Burke et al. [I] We used these competitions to study a number of human-robot inmfaces to determine what information helps the operator successfully navigate the come and locate victims. Although we have no control over the user interfaces, these competitions allow us to see a wide variety of designs and to determine how effective different features are in supporting USAR work The competition simulates the stressful environment of a real disaster site by limiting the time periods that robots can be in the arena. Since it is a competition, additional pressure is added by the desire to perform well. However, the safety issues that would be present in a real disaster are not present in the competition setting.
II. MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS
Olsen and Goodrich [6] offer six metrics to use in evaluating human-robot interaction: task effectiveness, neglect tolerance, robot attention demand, free time, fan out, and intmction effort. A brief description of each metric is provided in table 1.
In a study of a 2002 USAR competition, Yanco et al. [7] computed arena coverage, interaction effort, and amount of US. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright time operators spent giving directions to the robots. These metics are useful in helping us measure progress in humanrobot interaction. However, it is difficult to extract information for designing more effective human-robot interactions &om performance mehics. Padova, Italy [9] . Eleven of these teams participated in our HRI study. Three arenas modeled after the MST arenas were constructed. The arenas were denoted as yellow, orange, and red and contained varying degrees of difficulty. Victims in the arenas w m dummies, some of which had tape recorders so they could be identified using audio sensors. All victims had heat for thermal identification.
The yellow arena resembled an office environment that had suffered minor damage. Rubble consisted mainly of overturned furniture, papers, and Venetian blinds. Victims in this arena could be located visually for the most part. The orange arena was multilevel and had more rubble, such as loose bricks, mesh, and wire. Some victims were hidden so that only hands or feet were visible. The red arena was multilevel with large holes in the upper level that robots had to avoid falling through. The floor was strewn with loose bricks, gravel, rubber tubing, and wire. Again, some victims were hidden. Some could only be heard or identified using thermal sensors. Fig. 1 and 2 show the difficulty of the arena environment in the orange and red arenas. The teams had t h e chances in the preliminary round to navigate through the arenas to locate victims. They were allocated 20 minutes for each of these runs. The six top scoring teams were allowed to move to the semifmls. These teams were given two runs each for the semifmals. The top four teams in the semifmals moved to the finals where again they were given two runs.
A. Data Collection
We selected only their s e m i f d and fmal m s for the analysis we present here. The competition was run for five consecutive days and some of the teams changed their robots and their human-robot interaction capabilities during the week. There were no changes for these teams between the semifinals and the finals so we are analydng the same human-robot interaction capabilities in both sets of m s . As the teams were involved in a competition, we had to make ow data collection as unobtrusive as possible. For this reason we were not able to collect think-aloud protocols [lo] from the operators as they navigated the arena. We talked to operators after their runs but time was limited as they had to vacate the area to get ready for the next team to set up. We were not allowed to put additional software on the teams' computers, so we used video equipment to capture the graphical user interface and any additional monitors or computer displays that were being used. Some teams developed maps that were kept on a different laptop.
Often teams used a different display for the video being sent back from the robot. We also collected video of the robots moving in the arenas. This data, along with maps drawn by the competition judges of the paths the robots took, forms "ground truth" data. That is, we can tell exactly where and when (the video is time-stamped) events occurred.
B. Team Descriptions
extremely different user interfaces. teleoperated and used only one operator.
Team A used a v i r h~l reality 'ype of user interface. The operator used goggles to view the video being sent back from the robot. The goggles were used in conjunction with a head hacking device that allowed the operator to control one of three cameras mounted on the vehicle: low mounted h n t and back cameras with 1 degree of freedom and a higher mounted front facing camera with 2 degrees of freedom. This allowed the operator to view the front wheels of the robot. The operator could select from a full display of information superimposed on the video display, a simpler view, or video only. Other information available included the camera selected, thermal sensor display, and an indicator of camera position relative to the robot body. The operator also had audio sensing available. There was the ability to capture still photos of the victims or the arena for later viewing. Figure 3a shows the full view of the user interface although the simpler view (Figure 3b ) was the one used the majority of the time.
Team B used two robots. One robot, on a tether, was used only as a communications relay. The other robot returned two video feeds on two separate displays. One video feed was h m a movable camera and was controlled, as was the robot, using a joystick. The camera was mounted relatively high on the robot and allowed the operator to view the fiont portion of the robot We focused our analysis on the top three teams.
The three teams whose m s are discussed in this paper bad All of the robots were as it moved. The second camera was fixed and pointed down from the top of the robot giving a view of the robot and several inches of space surrounding the robot. The user interface on the laptop was only used for starting up the robot. When the robot is used outdoors the map can be automatically generated using the robot's GPS. Figure 4 shows Team C's GUI.
N. ANALYSIS
We identified "critical incidents" that we saw during the runs and defmed them as a situation where the robot could potentially cause damage to itself, the victim or the environment based on Leveson's definition of safety-critical situations [I 11 . Critical incidents can have positive as well as negative outcomes. A positive outcome for a critical incident could be navigating safely through a very narrow space. A negative outcome could be moving a wall enough to cause a secondary collapse. In this study, we only coded critical incidents with negative outcomes. However, we did note a number of critical incidents with positive outcomes to help us understand bow elements of the user interaction helped the operators' successes. 
A. Quantitutive Results
Two of the researchers coded 12 runs; two semifmal m s for the three teams and two fmal runs for each team. Overall there were 52 critical incidents found by at least one of the coders. There were 15 incidents that were missed by one of the coders. Coder one found 6 incidents that coder two did not; coder two found 9 incidents that coder one did not. Overall the coders agreed on 71% of the incidents.
The two coders independently coded eight nms using the critical incident definitions and computed the agreement on those incidents using the Kappa coefficient. The Kappa coefficient [I21 computed for the 22 incidents found by both coders was 0.926. The agreement for coding the incidents that both coders found was extremely high but fmding the same incidents initially was more problematic.
The coders associated only one type of HRI awareness with the critical incidents. In all cases, problem were due to a lack of human-robot HRI awareness @er our previous def~tion: "The understanding that the humans have of the locations, identities, activities, status and surrounding of the robots."). We will provide examples of these problem as we discuss critical incidents below. Human-human and robot-robot HRI awareness were not applicable because only one operator was employed by each team, and, while multiple robots were sometimes fielded, the robots did not communicate interactively with each other. Similarly, robot-human HRI awareness was not applicable because the robots were not autonomous; therefore, they were not responsible for interpreting humans' commands other than basic teleoperation and sensor operation commands. Finally, humans' overall mission understanding awareness remained high in all cases due to the straightforward nature of the task (locate and map victims), so no problems were traceable to this type of awareness.
In contrast, the coders associated three out of five of the task type classifications with the critical incidents. Table N shows the breakdown of critical incidents by task type and team. To produce this table, the two coders discussed the critical incidents that they originally disagreed on and anived at an agreement. Table IV contains all critical incidents found by both coders. Obstacle encounters were the most frequent type of critical incident, followed by local navigation and vehicle state. In this study, Team C had a global view of the arena in their omni directional camera. Team C also provided a map that the operator used to mark the location of victims. However, we didn't find any critical incidents in these runs that involved global navigation. We did note several incidents of this type in earlier nms, not analyzed in this paper, but there were few of these incidents. The arenas in this particular competition were smaller than the standard NIST test arenas so global navigation was not a major issue. This will not be true in general in USAR environments and we will need to devise some experiments to study information needs for global navigation.
1) Global Navigaiion 2) Local Navigaiion
All the teams had critical incidents involving local navigation, though Teams A and B had fewer incidents than Team C. Team B had only one incident involving local navigation during these runs.
Team A was successful in large part because the operator had the ability to construct a kame of reference by using the 2 degrees of W o r n camera to view the robot's front wheels in relation to obstacles in the FIRM. We saw a number of instances where this strategy allowed the robot to go through extremely tight spaces; Team A maintained excellent HRI awareness of the robot's location and surroundings.
Team B s overhead camera was also used by the operator to view the space directly beside the robot and obtain HEU awareness, though this view was fixed and less flexible than Team A's. However, using a strategy on the part of the operator rather than an automatic behavior on the part of the robot places cognitive demands on the operator. One idea to mitigate cognitive demands is to integrate the camera output with sonar data so that when an obstacle is sensed, the obstacle is automatically displayed in the camera view.
Rear cameras also helped operators maintain HRI awareness of the robot's surroundings. Team A backed up a number of times when the space was too tight to turn around. However, the operator had to manually switch to the rear camera even when backing up. Team C had a 360-degree view but this clearly did not help in local navigation, although we did see one instance in an earlier run where this was useful in global navigation.
Trying to navigate steep and slippery slopes is also an issue. Indicators of traction would be useful. Operators could also benefit kom a referent to provide awareness of the slope or steepness of a ramp or incline. Using only the video feed places a large cognitive load on the operator because the operator must use subtle visual cues from the environment to estimate slope. Having sensors and referents to gauge the difficulty of a slope could be beneficial.
3) Obsiace Encounter
Obstacle Encounter incidents were fewer for Team A than for the other teams. Team A bad both front and rear cameras as well as the front facing camera that could be manipulated. This gave the operator excellent awareness of obstacles at virtually any angle to the robof including to the rear. The ability to point his movable camera at various angles while navigating through the environment also gave Team A's operator an advantage; he was able to maintain awareness of obstacles while on the move.
There were many instances of robots getting stuck or entangled with obstacles, while the operators lacked sufficient HRI awareness to understand the cause of the entanglement. Operators infer that something is wrong if the video sent back firom the robot doesn't change even though they are commanding the robot to move. Sound is one means that operators use to determine that something is amiss; they hear motors revving, for example. If the environment is extremely noisy, as could certainly be the case in searcl1 and rescue, sound becomes useless. In other runs during this competition the operator in Team A mentioned that he used the audio to provide information about movement.
We also saw incidents where obstacles were stuck in the robot mechanism. While this did not prevent mobility in some instances, it could cause robots (and/or the obstscles stuck to the robots) to hit walls or victims. To the extent that operators did not understand the sue or nature of the shlck obstacles, they lacked HRI awareness of the robot's status. A means of self-inspection seems necessary to successfully extract robots from these obstacles. Information such as the amount of tread on the ground or the number of wheels on the ground might be helpful.
4) Vehicle Siaie
Vehicle state is closely related to obstacle encounters. We saw incidents where robots were on their side, did "wheelies" or had parts wedged under platforms. While information such as battery life and sensor status is displayed by some teams, sensors on different parts of the robots and pitch and roll indicators would be useful to provide HRI awareness of the robot's status and positions. 
5) Victim Identification
Victims in the NIST arena could be located using vision, thermal, sound, and motion. In several instances teams used sound and thermal signatures tn identify possible victims. In other runs in the competition we saw an incident where a robot with audio was able to detect a victim using sound We did not see any misidentification of victims in these runs, although the competition rules are expanding to include identifying the state of the victim. This will necessitate a close inspection by the robat to determine if the victim is conscious.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed definitions of critical incidents and a coding scheme and used these to compare the performance of tbree teams in the USAR competition. Based on this assessment we examined the user interaction and identified potential information displays that, if implemented, may reduce the number of critical incidents. Based on this analysis we have generated five guidelines for information display for USAR robots.
Information displays for USAR should include:
A frame of reference to determine position of robot relative to environment (and provide awareness of the Indicators of robot health/state, including which camera is being used, the position($ of camera(s), traction information, and pitchholl indicators (to provide better awareness of the robot's status)
Information from multiple sensors presented in an integrated fashion (to avoid relying on the operator devising strategies to overcome information fragmentation and facilitate better awareness of the robot's location and surroundings)
The ability to self inspect the robot body for damage or entangled obstacles (to provide enhanced awareness of the robot's status) Automatic presentation of contexiually-appropriate information, such as automatically switching to a rear camera view if the robot is backing up Many other competitions were co-located with the Rescue Robot competition at Robocup and we saw many instances of wireless interference and degraded video. This is not unlike robot's surroundings) conditions during actual search and rescue activities. Therefore, heavy reliance on video will impair the operator's ability to teleoperate during some periods of time. We recommend that feedback from other sensors be used to supplement video.
VI. FUTURE
The USAR competitions have allowed us to assess problems with current human-robot interaction and to develop some hypotheses about information that appears useful. The next step is to determine experimentally what information and what presentation of that information is helpful in providing awareness for operators of USAR robotics. We are working with several USAR teams to develop these experiments and test them in the NIST arena.
